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LET'S NOT JUMP TO CONCLUSIONS:
APPROACHING FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
CHALLENGES UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Thomas G. Varnum*
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 invalidates voting qualfications that
deny the right to vote on account of race or color. This Article confronts a split
among thefederal appellate courts concerning whetherfelons may rely on Section 2
when challenging felon disenfranchisement laws. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals allows felon disenfranchisement challenges under Section 2; however, the
Second and Eleventh Circuits foresee unconstitutional consequences and thus do
not. After discussing the background of voting rights jurisprudence, history offelon
disenfranchisement laws, and evolution of Section 2, this Article identifies the points
of contention among the disagreeingcourts.
The crux of this Article is that both sides of the debate have erred. Both sides
wrongly assume that the consequences of accepting these vote denial challenges are
predictable. However, because a standard approach to vote denial challenges under
Section 2 does not currently exist, no court can foresee the results of allowing such
challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws. Therefore, predicting the constitutional
implications of accepting these challenges without first identifying an appropriate
analysis is impossible.
This Article concludes by proposing an analysis for consideration. The proposed
approach is a tailored version of sliding scale scrutiny--an analysis that the United
States Supreme Courtfollowing Burdick v. Takushi, now applies to constitutional
voting rights claims. Using this adapted approach, the Supreme Court can resolve the
current split in authority and find that Section 2 is a viable vehicle for challenging
racially-discriminatory
felon disenfranchisement laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal courts are jumping to conclusions about the constitutionality of allowing felon disenfranchisement challenges under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act ("VRA"). In the midst of their leaps, these courts have
skipped over a crucial analytical step, leading to potential misapplications
of the VRA. Because of their flawed analyses, some federal courts may
silently be condoning infringements of certain citizens' right to voteprecisely the harm theVRA seeks to prevent.'
1.
Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. 5 1973 (2007). The right to vote, although
under-exercised and seemingly under-appreciated by many Americans, is an undeniably
fundamental aspect of American citizenship. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) (stating that voting is of most fundamental significance
under our constitutional structure); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621,
626 (1969) (requiring a careful explanation of statutes regulating voting because such statutes constitute foundation of representative society); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 56162 (1964) (declaring that unabridged right to vote is fundamental because voting preserves
other basic rights); see also Bernard Grofhsan, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of
Voting Rights Case Law, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGl4TS ACT
IN PERSPECTIVE 197, 205 (Bernard Grofinan & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (discussing
problems with minority voter turnout and suspecting that they reflect lingering effects of

discrimination).
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Through section 2 of the VRA, Congress granted courts the power
to strike down laws that disproportionately burden minorities' voting
rights.2 Presently, however, federal courts disagree about whether felons
may challenge state felon disenfranchisement statutes under that section.
The current split of authority threatens to prevent challenges to statutes
that disenfranchise felons, even though such statutes often have disproportionate effects on minorities. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals allows
challenges to felon disenfranchisement statutes under section 2. 4The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, prohibits challenges to felon
disenfranchisement statutes under section 2 because of concerns that allowing such challenges violates constitutional provisions
Importantly, an analytical flaw exists within these federal courts' decisions. Both courts have ignored an important question in their analyses:
how would courts approach section 2 challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws? Instead, these courts simply presume an ability to foresee the
juridical effects and constitutional implications of allowing these challenges.
This Article addresses and responds to the courts' flawed reasoning.
Specifically, this Article asserts that a uniform approach to section 2 challenges must exist before courts can determine the constitutionality of
allowing section 2 challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws.6 Currently,
however, there is no uniform approach. This Article responds to the
flawed reasoning by proposing a workable approach to felon disenfranchisement challenges under section 2.
Part I discusses the emergence of voting protections, the history of
felon disenfranchisement laws, and the evolution of section 2 of the VRA.
2.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2007); see discussion infra Part I.D. Congress and federal
courts reject voting regulations that disproportionately burden minority voting rights in
other contexts as well. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (prohibiting poll taxes); U.S.
CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting states from denying right to vote on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222,233 (1985)
(striking Alabama felon disenfranchisement law because of invidious legislative intent);
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (striking Oklahoma grandfather clause that
exempted most whites from literacy test).
3.
Compare Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing felon
disenfranchisement challenge under section 2), and Wesley v. Collins, 791 E2d 1255 (6th
Cir. 1986) (holding, implicitly, that challenge is sustainable by applying section 2 analysis to
challenged felon disenfranchisement law), with Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F3d 305 (2d Cir.
2006) (precluding felon disenfranchisement challenge under section 2), and Johnson v.
Bush, 405 E3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (precluding felon disenfranchisement challenge under section 2).

4.

See infra Part II.A.

5.
6.

See infra Part Jl.B.
See infra Part 1II.

7.
See Daniel P Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REv. 689, 709 (2006) (discussing lack of standard approach to vote
denial claims under section 2).
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Part II examines the current circuit split regarding whether plaintiffs can
challenge felon disenfranchisement laws under section 2 of the VRA. Part
III analyzes the need for a standard approach to these challenges and argues that a variation of sliding scale scrutiny is the best approach.
I. BACKGROUND
Statutes denying a felon the right to vote are conceptually basic.
Upon conviction of a felony, a person loses his right to vote for a specific
duration.8 However, challenges to these laws combine many legal principles. 9 In order to appreciate how these principles interact, one should
understand felon disenfranchisement laws' place in the history and future
of voting rights jurisprudence.
A. The Right to Vote
Under Chief Justice Earl Warren the United States Supreme Court
made significant advancements in identifying and protecting the right to
vote. 0 Prior to these advancements, many citizens found little assistance in
the struggle to obtain voting rights." The Warren Court began protecting

8.
See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("No person who has been convicted of a felony
shall be qualified to vote unless his civil rights have been restored by the Governor or
other appropriate authority.").
9.
These challenges inextricably combine multiple legal doctrines such as fundamental rights and suspect class protection, or vote denial and vote dilution claims. See
Hayden v. Pataki, 449 E3d 305, 309 (2d Cir. 2006) (confronting challenge to New York's
felon disenfranchisement statute as both vote denial and vote dilution); C. City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 113 (1980) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (discussing difference between
fundamental rights protection and suspect class protection as applied to race based voting
rights challenges).
10.
See generally Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (striking regulation preventing resident from voting in school board election); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking state statute imposing poll tax); Lucas v.
Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (holding that majority of citizens cannot vote to abridge minority's voting rights); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (mandating reapportionment of Alabama districting scheme).
11.
Courts traditionally interpreted the original Constitution as a document of
negative restrictions, failing to guarantee anyone the affirmative right to vote. See, e.g.,
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 170-78 (1874) (holding that Constitution does not
grant any citizen affirmative right to vote). The text of the original Constitution only
required an election for the members of the House. U.S. CONsT. art I, 5 4, cl. 1. Gradually,
the notion of a protected right to vote emerged through the amendment process. See U.S.
CONST. amends. XIV, XVII, IXX, XXIV, XXVI (specifically referring to "right to vote"
and prohibiting poll taxes). Further frustrating citizens' efforts to attain the right to vote
was the Court's disposition to avoid voting claims by invoking the political question doctrine. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (holding that a claim of inadequate
representation and responsiveness was a political question and thus non-justiciable).
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the right to vote by identifying voting as a fundamental right, 2 thereby
allowing the Fourteenth Amendment to serve as a vehicle for challenging
statutes that abridge the right to vote. 13 Consistent with the Supreme
Court's fundamental
rights jurisprudence, these challenges invoked strict
4
scrutiny review.1
After recognizing a fundamental right to vote, the Supreme Court
began identifying those entitled to this right. Gradually, the Court defined
a core electorate of those individuals who satisfied the age, residency, citizenship, and non-felon status requirements set by their state legislatures.1'
Absent a compelling state interest, the Supreme Court required states to
enfranchise all individuals who satisfied these requirements. 6 Accordingly,
statutes disenfranchising members of the core electorate triggered strict

12.
See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62 (stating that right to
vote is fundamental in free and democratic society).
13.
See, e.g., Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 690 (1989) (pursuing Fourteenth Amendment voting rights challenge to representation on local board); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 331-32 (1972) (pursuing Fourteenth Amendment challenge to
durational residency voting restriction); Lucas, 377 U.S. at 713 (pursuing Fourteenth
Amendment voting rights challenge to Colorado districting scheme).
14.
See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (applying strict
scrutiny to statute abridging fundamental right to familial living situation); Dunn, 405 U.S.
at 337, 342 (applying strict scrutiny to Tennessee's durational residency voting qualification); Stanley v.Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny to statute
abridging fundamental right to familial custody); Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626-27 (applying
strict scrutiny to statute abridging fundamental right to vote); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to statute abridging fundamental right to marry).
15.
See Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the People": Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 MICH.J. INr'L L. 259,313-14 (1992) (discussing and defining term "core
electorate"); see also Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982) (holding that
formal citizenship can be prerequisite to voting rights); Richardson v. Ramirez 418 U.S. 24,
56 (1974) (holding that state can disenfranchise felons pursuant to constitutional authority); Dunn, 405 U.S. at 360 (holding that Tennessee's durational residency requirement for
voting was unconstitutional); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 130-31 (1970) (holding that
Congress could not force states to enfranchise eighteen-year-olds); Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89,96-97 (1965) (holding that Texas could not deny members of Army voting rights
when members were bona fide residents of town).
16.
See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 628-29. A sole exception to this principle emerged
through the development of the one person/one vote doctrine. See also Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728 (1973) (recognizing that special
purpose of district allowed for unequal vote weighing). When a local governing body is
not part of the core government, associated electoral schemes that deny one person/one
vote representation do not trigger strict scrutiny. See Ball v.James, 451 U.S. 355, 370 (1981)
(finding one acre/one vote scheme permissible when irrigation district did not possess
traditional government powers); Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728 (finding one acre/one vote scheme
permissible when district had a special, limited purpose and disproportionate impact);
Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U.
Cm. L. REv. 339, 362-67 (1993) (discussing one person/one vote doctrine and exceptions
for local governments).
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scrutiny because those members had a fundamental right to vote. 7 Under
strict scrutiny, a challenged statute is only valid if it is necessary in achieving a compelling state interest.18 Statutes disenfranchising non-members,
however, triggered only rational basis review because people outside of
the core electorate do not have a fundamental right to vote.' 9 Under rational basis review, such statutes are valid if they are rationally related to
achieving a legitimate state interest.2 °
Despite conforming to fundamental rights jurisprudence, applying
strict scrutiny to every restriction of the core electorate's right to vote
proved unworkable. 1 In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court realized that
any statute regulating elections theoretically imposes some restriction on
voting rights.22 If the Court applied strict scrutiny to all election statutes,
many would be found unconstitutional.23 For fear of infringing states'
autonomy in controlling elections, the Court sought a new approach that
did not employ strict scrutiny irrespective of the voting restriction's severity.24 Instead, the Court believed that adjusting the level of scrutiny
relative to the severity of the voting restriction better respected states'
25
autonomy.
B. Burdick v. Takushi
In Burdick v. Takushi, the Supreme Court adopted sliding scale scrutiny as a workable approach to voting rights claims under the Fourteenth
26
Amendment. In Burdick, a registered voter filed suit against the Hawaii
Director of Elections to challenge Hawaii's write-in candidacy prohibition. The plaintiff framed the challenge as one of voting rights
infringement because the prohibition prevented him from voting for the
person he wished to elect. 28 The District Court for the District of Hawaii

17.
See, e.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. at 337, 342 (using strict scrutiny to sustain challenge to
residency restriction by plaintiff who was bona fide resident).
18.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1462 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "strict scrutiny").

19.
See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 70 (1978) (using rational
basis review to deny challenge to residency restriction by non-resident plaintifl).
20.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1290

(8th ed. 2004) (defining "rational-basis test").

21.
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (discussing how applying strict
scrutiny to every state voting regulation would unacceptably tie hands of states trying to
operate elections efficiently).
22.
See id. (acknowledging that election laws invariably impose some amount of
burden on voters).
See id. at 433-34.
23.
24.
See id.
25.
See id. at 433.
26.
Id. at 434.
27.
Id. at 430.
28.
Id. at 430-32.
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granted summary judgment for the plaintiff.29 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that Hawaii's ban on
write-in candidacy served a legitimate state interest. 3° The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether and when a state's power to regulate
could justify infringing a core electorate member's voting
elections
31
rights.

The Supreme Court held that Hawaii's interest in regulating elections outweighed the minimal burden on the plaintiff's right to vote. 32 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted the sliding scale approach
used in cases regarding a candidate's ability to appear on a ballot.33 Using
this approach, the Burdick Court found a minimal burden on the plaintiff's
voting rights because a candidate of choice could easily access the ballot.34
The Court then identified several legitimate state interests that sufficiently
justified the minimal burden on the plaintiff's right to vote. 35
In cases following Burdick, the Court began adjusting the level of
scrutiny based on how severely the challenged regulation burdened the
right to vote. 36 Under this approach, a statute imposing a slight burden on
3
7 However, a statute imposing a
voting rights triggers rational basis Sreview.
38
severe burden receives strict scrutiny. Thus, before applying the appropriate level of scrutiny, a court confronting a voting rights challenge must
first determine the severity of the burden. 39This analysis became the accepted judicial approach to voting rights claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment.40
29.
Burdick v.Takushi, 737 F Supp. 582, 592 (D. Haw. 1990).
30.
Burdick v.Takushi, 937 F.2d 415,422 (9th Cir. 1991).
Burdick v.Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432 (1992).
31.
Id. at 439 (discussing state's interest in avoiding "possibility of unrestrained fac32.
tionalism at the general election" (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189,
196 (1986)).
See id. at 434; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 (1983) (applying
33.
sliding scale scrutiny to ballot access claim). The Court justified borrowing this approach
from candidates' rights cases because one cannot easily separate the rights of voters and
candidates. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438 (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)).
34.
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434-39.
35.
Id. at 439-40.
See cases cited infra notes 44-47.
36.
37.
See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438-39 (applying relaxed standard of review because
burden is slight); Werme v. Merrill, 84 F3d 479, 485-86 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying rational
basis review).
38.
See Duke v. Smith, 13 F.3d 388, 395 (11th Cit. 1994) (applying strict scrutiny
because burden is severe); Ayers-Schaffiier v. DiStefano, 860 E Supp. 918,921 (D.R.I. 1994)
(applying strict scrutiny).
39.
See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
See generally Werme, 84 E3d at 483-84, (applying Burdick analysis to voting rights
40.
claim); Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying Burdick analysis to
voting rights claim); Partnoy v. Shelley, 277 E Supp. 2d 1064, 1073 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (applying Burdick analysis to voting rights claim). However, in Bush v. Gore, a relatively modern
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C. Felon DisenfranchisementLaws in the United States
Borrowing from European models, statutes disenfranchising citizens
as punishment for a crime date back to colonial times in the United
41
States. Over time, these laws became both more common and more se
vere. That is, as the number of states enacting such laws increased, the
durations of disenfranchisement increased as well.43
Today, four categories of felon disenfranchisement laws exist, imposing burdens of varying degrees on a felon's ability to vote.44 First, fourteen
states and the District of Columbia prevent a felon from voting only for
the duration of the felon's incarceration.4' Second, five states extend the
voting restrictions beyond incarceration and prohibit voting while a felon
is on parole.46 Third, thirty states disenfranchise felons beyond parole and
prevent a felon from voting during the probationary period. 4' Finally, two
states prevent a felon from voting forever.48
The statutory language of felon disenfranchisement laws also varies.
While some laws disenfranchise citizens upon conviction for a felony offense, others
disenfranchise citizens upon conviction for crimes of moral
•
49
turpitude. Such differences in statutory language allow two states to encase, the Supreme Court addressed a voting rights claim without referring to Burdick. 531
U.S. 98, 110-11 (2000). One can read this opinion as threatening the accepted practice of
applying sliding scale scrutiny to voting rights claims. See, e.g., Stewart v. Blackwell, 444
E3d 843, 859-62 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing approach to voting rights challenge following
Bush v. Gore and Burdick, and deciding that Bush v. Gore was proper approach). However,
some judges and scholars question the continued validity of the Bush opinion as binding
precedent on voting rights jurisprudence. See Stewart, 444 E3d at 887-89 (Gilman, J.,
dissenting); Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections,
29 FLA. ST. U. L. RiEv. 377, 380-92 (2001) (discussing reasons for not taking Bush v. Gore
seriously).
41.
For a thorough analysis of the history of these laws, see Angela Behrens, Note,
Voting-Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and Legislative Challenges to Felon
DisenfranchisementLaws, 89 MINN. L. REV.231, 236 (2004).
42.
Id. at 237-38.
43.
Id.
44.
See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES 3 (Sept. 2008), available at http://sentencingproject.org/Admin/
Documents/publications/fd bs fdlawsinus.pdf; see also Behrens, supra note 41, at 239 (discussing four categories of modern felon disenfranchisement statutes). Only Vermont and
Maine do not disenfranchise felons, allowing even those currently incarcerated to vote. See
Behrens, supra note 41, at 239; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra.

45.

See THE

SENTENCING PROJECT,

supra note 44.

46.
See id.
47.
See id.
48.
These states are Kentucky andVirginia. See id.
49.
See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 15.05.030 (2006) (disenfranchising persons upon conviction of felony involving moral turpitude). Recently, a federal district court dismissed,
on other grounds, a challenge to that state's felon disenfranchisement statute because it
contained such language. Gooden v. Worley, No. CV-2005-5778-RSV (N.D. Ala. May 26,
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force otherwise comparable laws imposing equal durations of disenfranchisement in different manners. 0 For example, when applying their state's
statutory language, courts in one state may permanently disenfranchise
citizens upon conviction for any felony.51 At the same time, courts in another state may permanently disenfranchise citizens only upon conviction
of certain crimes-quite possibly those of which minorities are more
commonly convicted. s2 In fact, some bygone state legislatures have intentionally manipulated the statutory language of felon disenfranchisement
laws to have this effect.5 3
1. The Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws
Felon disenfranchisement laws deny over 5.3 million otherwise
qualified voters the opportunity to elect their governmental representatives5 4 These laws deny more American citizens the right to cast a ballot
55
than any other voting restriction. In states imposing a lifetime ban, some
experts estimate that forty percent of the next generation of African
5 6
American males may eventually suffer permanent disenfranchisement.
Despite racially neutral language, felon disenfranchisement statutes
disproportionately affect racial minority groups. 7 In 2004, one in twelve
African Americans could not vote because of felon disenfranchisement

2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/order5-2606.pdf
50.
See Bailey Figler, Comment, A Vote for Democracy: Confronting tile Racial Aspects of
Felon Disenfranchisement,61 N.YU. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 723, 738-39 (2006) (discussing how
language of some felon disenfranchisement has intentional racially disparate application);
discussion of Gooden supra note 49.
51.
See, e.g., Ky. Const. § 145.
52.
See Katharine Mieszkowski, Barred From Voting, SALON, Oct. 19, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/10/19/felons (discussing racially biased
application of disenfranchisement statutes in Alabama and Mississippi); see, e.g., Hunter v.
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1985) (striking Alabama felon disenfranchisement law
that applied to crimes of moral turpitude because of invidious intent).
53.
See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 226-27.
54.
See Behrens, supra note 41, at 231; Ryan S. King, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A
DECADE OF REFORM: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT POLICY IN THE U.S., in THE SENTENCING
PROJECT 1 (2006), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/FVP,Decade_
Reform.pdf.
55.
See Behrens, supra note 41, at 231.
56.
See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 44.
57.
See Behrens, supra note 41, at 244-47; RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
EXPANDING THE VOTE: STATE FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM, 1997-2008 3
(Sept. 2008), available at http://sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/
fd statedisenfranchisement.pdf.
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laws. 8 In contrast, these laws prevent only about one in sixty non-African
Americans from voting.59
This disproportionate impact is the result of minority overrepresentation among felons in most states. Many scholars believe that
this is the result of unequal treatment of minorities throughout the criminal justice system. 1 In many states, the government disproportionately
stops, searches, arrests, books, charges, convicts, and sentences minorities as
62
compared to non-minorities.
Because this unequal treatment varies by state, felon disenfranchisement statutes in some states more severely affect minorities than do
similar statutes in other states. For example, in Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
and Illinois, the disenfranchisement rate of African Americans is more
than seventeen times greater than that of non-African Americans.63 By
contrast, Hawaii disenfranchises proportionally fewer African Americans
than non-African Americans.64 Consequently, the degree to which felon
disenfranchisement statutes result in a racially skewed impact on voting
rights also varies by state.
2. Richardson v. Ramirez
After the Warren Court began protecting voting rights, felons attempted to challenge the statutes that disenfranchised them.6' In Ramirez,
58.
59.
60.
61.

See KING, supra note 57, at 2 (2006).
Id.
See Behrens, supra note 41, at 244-45.
See id. at 244-45; see also CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1993);
MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 126-36 (1999) (discussing connection between incarceration rates and race); John Hepburn, Race and the Decision to Arrest: An Analysis of
Warrants Issued, 15 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 54, 66 (1978). But see Alfred Blumstein, On the
Racial Disproportionalityof United States' Prison Populations, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1259, 1280-81 (1982) (suggesting that overrepresentation of minorities in prison population may be result of higher rates of crime commission among minorities); John Hagan,
Extra-LegalAttributes and Criminal Sentencing:An Assessment of a Sociological Viewpoint, 8 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 357, 378 (1974) (concluding that race was statistically insignificant factor in
non-capital cases).

62.

See

ENGEN ET AL., RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN SENTENCING OUTCOMES
FY1996 TO FY1999 52-59 (1999); OJMARRH

FOR DRUG OFFENDERS IN WASHINGTON STATE:

MITCHELL & DORIS L. MACKENZIE, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RACE, ETHNICITY, AND

SENTENCING OUTCOMES:A MEIA-ANALYSis OF SENTENCING RESEARCH 125-28 (2004).
63.
See KING, supra note 57, at 18.
64.
See ELIZABETH A. HULL, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT o Ex-FELONS 11 (2006)
(listing disenfranchisement rates by race and state).
65.
See supra Part I.A; see, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 223-24 (1985)
(challenging state's felon disenfranchisement statute under Fourteenth Amendment);
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 27 (1974) (challenging state's felon disenfranchisement statute under Fourteenth Amendment); Allen v. Ellisor, 664 E2d 391, 395 (4th Cir.
1981) (challenging state's felon disenfranchisement statute under Fourteenth Amendment).
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felons from California challenged that state's disenfranchisement statute
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.66 The
felons invoked original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of California
by seeking a writ of mandate compelling election officials to register
them to vote. 67 The California Supreme Court held that the challenged
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, and the state subsequently
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.68
Despite the clear impact on felons' voting rights, the Supreme Court
sustained the law without employing strict scrutiny.69 Instead, the Court
found authorization for felon disenfranchisement statutes in Section 2 of
70
the Fourteenth Amendment°.
This section explicitly exempts states from
reduced representation in the House of Representatives when disenfranchising citizens for participation in rebellion or other crime. 71 By
declining to subject felon disenfranchisement laws to strict scrutiny, the
Ramirez Court ended the Fourteenth Amendment's potential as a vehicle
for challenges to these laws. 72 Following Ramirez, courts now routinely
apply rational basis review to Fourteenth Amendment felon disenfranchisement challenges and find legitimate justifications for such laws.73

66.
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 27.
67.
Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199,202-03 (1973).
68.
Id. at 216-17; see Richardson v. Ramirez, 414 U.S. 816, 816 (1973) (granting
certiorari).
69.
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 41-42, 54; see U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 2.
70.
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 41-42, 54 (finding affirmative authorization for felon
disenfranchisement statutes in Section 2 of Fourteenth Amendment); see U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2.
71.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
72.
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54-55; see also Allen v. Ellisor, 664 E2d 391,395 (4th Cir.
1981) (stating that Richardson decision closed door to equal protection challenges to felon
disenfranchisement statutes). Several years later, the Court held that the equal protection
doctrine was not entirely unavailable to felons wishing to challenge the laws that disenfranchise them. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (holding that when
plaintiff can establish invidious legislative intent, statute will be subject to strict scrutiny).
Without direct evidence of invidious intent, plaintiffl are currently unable to invoke
heightened scrutiny of felon disenfranchisement challenges under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Hunter,471 U.S. at 230-31.
73.
See Baker v. Cuomo, 58 E3d 814,820-21 (2d Cit. 1995) (applying rational basis
review to felon disenfranchisement challenge and discussing social contract justification for
such laws); Williams v. Taylor, 677 E2d 510, 514 (5th Cir. 1982) (employing rational basis
review to deny Fourteenth Amendment challenge to felon disenfranchisement statute);
Mixom v. Commonwealth 759 A.2d 442,449,451-52 (Pa. Conmmw. Ct. 2000) (upholding
felon disenfranchisement statute under rational basis review and discussing valid state interest in ensuring that those who obey society's rules make them).
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D. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the 1982 Amendments
In 1965, Congress enacted the V1RA to protect the voting power of
minorities in the United States. 74 Due to the historical clash between state
legislatures and the federal government when regulating or protecting
voting rights, the VRA is an intentionally broad and prophylactic statute
that prevents discriminatory voting regulations.75 Consistent with that
intent, the Supreme Court
requires that courts interpret and apply this
76
Act as broadly as possible.
Section 2 of the VRA prohibits states from denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color. There are two traditional categories of challenges under section 2.78 In vote dilution challenges,
plaintiffs allege that a voting scheme-commonly a districting arrangement-diminishes minorities' political influence without denying them
the opportunity to vote.79 In vote denial challenges, by contrast, plaintiffs
allege that a voting regulation disproportionately diminishes minorities'
ability to cast ballots.80
In 1980, the Supreme Court faced a redistricting challenge that
questioned the proper judicial approach to section 2 claims."' In City of
Mobile v. Bolden the Court decided that section 2 paralleled the Fifteenth
Amendment and provided no additional voting protection for minori-

74.
RIGHTS

Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2007); see U. S. DEP'T

DIV.,

OF JUSTICE, CIVIL

VOTING SECTION, INTRODUCTION TO FED. VOTING RIGHTS LAWS: THE VOTING

1965, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/intro/introb.htm (last visited
Feb. 12, 2007).
75.
See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1969) (discussing
broad legislative intent of VRA); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 E3d 305, 361-62 (2d Cir. 2006)
(Parker,J., dissenting) (discussing historical struggle between federal government and creatively oppressive state legislatures, and need for VRA to be broad and prophylactic). The
series of cases known as the white primary cases, in which the Supreme Court protected
black Texas citizens' right to vote, exemplifies this struggle. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461, 470 (1953) (holding that private political association could not disenfranchise black
citizens); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664-66 (1944) (holding that Texas Democratic
Party could not prevent black citizens from voting in primary elections); Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (holding that Texas legislature could not disenfranchise
black citizens).
76.
See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1990) (Warning that even if courts
foresee problems in applying congressionally mandated totality of circumstances approach,
courts cannot adopt judicially created limitation on coverage of VRA); Allen, 393 U.S. at
566-67 (requiring broad interpretation of VRA).
77.
42 U.S.C. § 1973.
78.
See Tokaji, supra note 7, at 691-92.
79.
See id.
80.
See id.
81.
See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980) (holding that use of
multimember district scheme did not violate section 2 ofVRA).
RIGHTS ACT OF
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ties. 2 As such, plaintiffs would need to establish invidious legislative intent
to prevail on any claim under section 2 of the VRA.83 This approach imposed a seemingly insurmountable burden on plaintiffs that neither
Congress nor civil rights activists accepted. 84
In response to the Court's decision in City of Mobile, the Senate emphasized section 2 during re-enactment proceedings for section 4 of the
VRA, which lists universally prohibited state voting prerequisites and devices.8 ' Congress ultimately decided that, while Fifteenth Amendment
voting rights challenges require proof of actual discriminatory legislative
intent, challenges grounded in section 2 do not."' Instead, Congress mandated a "totality of circumstances" analysis for section 2 purposes and
identified seven appropriate factors of this analysis 8. Congress mandated
this approach to ensure that section 2 reaches all laws resulting in discriminatory voting rights infringement, instead of only the intentionally

discriminatory laws.88
Recently, plaintiffs have begun interpreting section 2 of the VRA as
a plausible vehicle for challenging felon disenfranchisement laws.89 These

plaintiffs argue that because felon disenfranchisement laws have a racially
disparate impact on voting rights, they fall within the scope of section

2.90

82.
Id.
Id. at 62.
83.
See Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting
84.
Rights Act:A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1378,1413-14 (1983).
85.
See id. at 1407;Voting Rights Act § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2007).
86.
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 15-19 (1982). Requiring invidious intent would render
section 2 useless because if plaintiffs can prove invidious intent, actions under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are already available. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (allowing felon disenfranchisement challenge under Fourteenth
Amendment when plaintiff can establish inyidious intent). The amended section 2 prohibits voting qualifications that result in denial or abridgement of the right to vote on
account of race or color.Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
Voting Rights Act § 2(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973; S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29
87.
(1982) (identifying non-exhaustive list of seven factors for analysis, including extent to
which minorities suffer discrimination in education, employment, and health).
88.
See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 30 (emphasizing that amended language shows that
plaintiffs need only show that system or practice results unequal minority access to political process, and not invidious intent). Bnt see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-62
(employing an intent test in analyzing section 2 challenge before 1982 amendments).
See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 E3d 305, 309 (2d Cir. 2006) (pursuing section 2 chal89.
lenge to felon disenfranchisement law);Johnson v. Bush, 405 F3d 1214, 1216 (11th Cir.
2005) (pursuing section 2 challenge to felon disenfranchisement law); Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F3d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003) (pursuing section 2 challenge to felon
disenfranchisement law); Wesley v. Collins, 791 E2d 1255, 1257 (6th Cir, 1986) (pursuing
section 2 challenge to felon disenfranchisement law).
See, e.g., Hayden, 449 F3d at 310-12 (featuring section 2 challenge to felon
90.
disenfranchisement statute); Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F3d 102, 103-06 (2d Cit. 2004)
(featuring section 2 challenge to felon disenfranchisement statute); Johnson v. Bush 214 F.
Supp. 2d 1333, 1335, 1341-42 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (featuring section 2 challenge to felon

MichiganJournalof Race & Law

[VOL. 14:109

However, under the current interpretation of the VRA, it is unclear if a
given court will sustain a challenge to these laws under section 2.
II.THE CURRENT SPLIT OF AUTHORITY

Despite its broad language and Congress's expansive intent, courts
disagree about section 2's ability to reach felon disenfranchisement statutes." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that section 2 is a
plausible vehicle for challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws.92 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has held that plaintiffs simply
cannot challenge felon disenfranchisement laws under section 2. 9 Considering this split in authority,94review by the Supreme Court appears to be
both necessary and probable.
A. The Ninth CircuitAllows VRA Challenges
In Farrakhanv. Washington, ex-felons in Washington challenged their
disenfranchisement, asserting that the state's felon disenfranchisement provision violated section 2 of the VRA.95 The District Court for the Eastern
disenfranchisement statute); Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F Supp. 1304, 1307-08 (E.D. Wash.
1997) (featuring section 2 challenge to felon disenfranchisement statute); Wesley v. Collins,
605 F Supp. 802, 804 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (featuring section 2 challenge to felon
disenfranchisement statute).
91.
Compare Farrakhan, 338 E3d 1009 (allowing felon disenfranchisement challenge
under section 2), and Wesley v. Collins, 791 E2d 1255, 1259-60 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding,
implicitly, that courts can sustain challenge by applying section 2 analysis to challenged
felon disenfranchisement law), with Hayden, 449 E3d 305 (precluding felon disenfranchisement challenge under section 2), and Johnson v. Bush, 405 E3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005)
(precluding felon disenfranchisement challenge under section 2).
92.
See Farrakhan,338 E3d at 1016. See generally Wesley, 791 E2d 1255 (engaging in
analysis of felon disenfranchisement challenge brought under section 2).
93.
See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 328;Johnson,405 F.3d at 1234-35.
94.
Some courts have discussed the need for Supreme Court review of this issue. See
Hayden, 449 F3d at 310 (noting circuit split and discussing need for Supreme Court review);
Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F3d 102,104 (2d Cit. 2004) (noting circuit split and discussing
need for Supreme Court review). Following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Farrakhan,the
State of Washington immediately filed a motion for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, but the Court denied this motion. Locke v. Farrakhan, 543 U.S. 984, 984
(2004). Some scholars believe that the Court denied certiorari for lack a final judgment,
given that the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further analysis. See Edward B. Foley,
Felon Disenfranchisement Reaches the Supreme Court, ELECTION LAW AT MORITZ,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/partl/eligibility_felon02.html (last visited
Feb. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Foley, Voter Eligibility]. After another district court judgment for
the state, the case is currently facing a second appellate review by the Ninth Circuit. Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 2006 WL 1889273 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006). After final review by
Ninth Circuit, it is likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari either in Farrakhan
or in a similar felon disenfranchisement case. See Foley, Voter Eligibility, supra.
95.
338 E3dat 1016,1011-12 (9th Cir. 2003); See WAsH.CONsT. art.VI,§ 3.
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District of Washington held that, although section 2 allows such challenges, the challenged law did not violate that provision. 96 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed that section 2 permits challenges to felon disenfranchisement statutes, but remanded the case for
proper analysis.
The Ninth Circuit initially emphasized that the text of section 2
proscribes voting qualifications that result in a racially disparate infringement on voting rights. 9s The court recognized that, by definition, felon
disenfranchisement laws impose a voting qualification on the electorate. 99
Thus, the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that a felon disenfranchisement law can violate the VRA if it results in a racially disparate
denial of voting rights. 00
The Ninth Circuit also recognized the policy implications of denying felon disenfranchisement challenges under section 2.101 The court
acknowledged that all citizens, even ex-felons, have the right to be free
from racially discriminatory voting regulations. 10 ' Mindful of this right,
the Ninth Circuit allowed the plaintiffs to challenge Washington's felon
disenfranchisement law under section 2.103

Farrakhan, 338 E3d at 1011.
96.
Id. at 1016, 1020. Unlike the District Court, the Ninth Circuit found that in97.
ternal biases in the criminal justice system should be part of the totality of circumstances
analysis. Id. at 1020. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case, and instructed
the district court to consider this evidence when analyzing the claim. Id.
98.
Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1014-16; see Voting Rights Act 5 2, 42 U.S.C. 5 1973(a)
(2007). The Supreme Court has held that this is the proper approach when interpreting a
statute. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (citing Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979)) (stating that in all cases involving statutory construction,
courts must start their analysis by looking at language employed by Congress).
See Farrakhan,338 E3d at 1016 (declaring that felon disenfranchisement statute
99.
is voting qualification, and section 2 clearly proscribes any voting qualification that denies
citizen's right to vote in discriminatory manner).
100.
See id. at 1016-17. Courts opposed to allowing these challenges find some ambiguity in the statutory language of the VRA in order to justify looking beyond the plain
text. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Bush, 405 F.3d 1214, 1229 n.30 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding some
ambiguity in language of section 2). For example, the Eleventh Circuit finds that the
phrase "on account of race or color" is ambiguous. Id. However, when faced with the
same issue, the Second Circuit failed to identify any ambiguity within the text. See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 E3d 305, 346 (2d Cir. 2006) (Parker, J., dissenting). Instead, that court
justified looking beyond the text when interpreting section 2 because it was not convinced that the language is unambiguous. See id.
Farrakhan, 338 E3d at 1016.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
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B. The Second Circuit Rejects VRA Challenges
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that challenges to
felon disenfranchisement laws cannot succeed under the VRA. 104 In Hayden v. Pataki, ex-felon citizens of New York and non-felon minority
citizens filed suit to challenge New York's felon disenfranchisement law.' 5
The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendants, ruling that plaintiffs cannot
challenge the law under section 2.106 On appeal, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. 0 7 Instead of analyzing the
merits of the claim, this court focused on the consequences of allowing
courts to accept felon disenfranchisement challenges under section 2.108
The Second Circuit predicted that allowing felon disenfranchisement challenges would create a series of unintended constitutional
problems for the VRA.'0 9 First, allowing courts to strike these laws under
the VRA could result in an unconstitutionally broad use of Congress's
enforcement powers.'10 That is, Congress passed the VRA under authority
of the enforcement powers granted in Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment, which affords Congress the power to enact appropriate statutes to enforce the Amendment. " To constitute a valid use of this power,
however, an enacted statute must be "congruent and proportional" to the

104.
See Hayden, 449 F3d at 309-10. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
faced a similar challenge to Florida's felon disenfranchisement law, and also rejected the
challenge under section 2.Johnson, 405 E3d at 1234 (holding that felon disenfranchisement
laws are immune fromVRA challenges).
105.
Hayden, 449 F3d at 311. The plaintiffs in Hayden included non-felon minorities
in order to pursue both a vote denial and vote dilution challenge under section 2. Id. at
310-11; see also discussion of vote denial and vote dilution challenges under section 2 supra
Part I.D.
106.
Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00 Civ. 8586(LMM), 2004 WL 1335921, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
June 14, 2004).
107.
Hayden, 449 E3d at 328.
108.
See id.; see also Johnson, 405 E3d at 1234 (rejecting section 2 challenge because of
constitutional concerns).
109.
See Hayden, 449 E3d at 328; see alsoJohnson, 405 E3d at 1234 (rejecting section 2
challenge because of constitutional concerns).
110.
See Hayden, 449 F3d at 335-37 (Walker,J., concurring); see also Johnson, 405 E3d
at 1230-32. Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may enact "appropriate legislation" to enforce those
amendments. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5, amend. XV, § 2.
111.
See U.S. CONsT. amend. XV § 2; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,
173 (1980) (stating that Congress passed VRA under authority of the Fifteenth Amendment's enforcement clause); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966)
(discussing Congress's use of Fifteenth Amendment's enforcement clause when enacting
VRA). But see Hayden, 449 E3d at 358 (Parker, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress enacted VRA under enforcement powers in both Four-teenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
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record of evil. '1 2 The Second Circuit acknowledged that prior to enacting
the VRA, Congress did not develop a specific record of racial discrimination resulting from felon disenfranchisement laws." 3 In the absence of a
specific record, the court predicted that the VRA will exceed Congress's
enforcement
powers if courts accept felon disenfranchisement chal4
lenges."
Second, the Second Circuit found that allowing these challenges
would unconstitutionally alter the balance of power between the federal
and state governments." 5 Recognizing states' broad powers to regulate
elections, the Second Circuit concluded that allowing the VRA to cover
felon disenfranchisement laws would restrict this power.16 Accordingly,
the court held that section 2 of the VRA cannot cover such statutes
ab7
sent a clear statement of intent to alter the federal-state balance."1
Finally, the Second Circuit reasoned that allowing felon
disenfranchisement challenges under section 2 of the VRA conflicts with
the Fourteenth Amendment."' Similar to the Ramirez Court, the Second
112.
See City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,520,530 (1997).
113.
See Hayden, 449 F3d at 335-37 (Walker, J., concurring);Johnson, 405 F3d at
1230-32.
114.
Hayden, 449 E3d at 335-36. While this argument lacks merit absent a standard,
predictable approach to vote denial claims, there are potential flaws to this argument even
at first glance. See discussion infra Parts lI.A., III.C. First, the Supreme Court has not required that the congressional record be entirely specific relative to the breadth of
Congress's resulting action. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28
(2003) (acknowledging that Congress may enact prophylactic legislation that proscribes
facially constitutional conduct in order to prevent subsequent unconstitutional conduct).
Furthermore, the Court has also held that when Congress is using this power to protect
the interests of a suspect class, the scope of this power is great. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526
(affirming the necessity of using strong remedial and preventive means of responding to
America's significant history of racial discrimination). Additionally, the scope of the defined evil significantly affects the merits of this rationale. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639-40 (1999) (discussing need for
court to identify purported evil before determining if Congress exceeded enforcement
powers). While The VRA was not a response to a significant record of intentionally discriminatory felon disenfranchisement statutes, Congress was responding to countless
discriminatory voting restrictions. See Behrens, supra note 41, at 244-47.
115.
Hayden, 449 F3d at 310-11,323; see also Johnson, 405 F3d at 1232 n.35.
116.
Hayden, 449 F.3d at 326; see U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (declaring, "The Times,
Places, and Manner of holding Elections ... shall be prescribed in each state by the
Legislature thereof"); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986)
(stating that Constitution grants states broad power to prescribe times, places, and manner
of elections and that this results in significant state control over elections); supra Part L.A
(discussing federal judicial protection of the right to vote). However, this power is not
unlimited. See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (discussing ability of Congress to
preempt state voting regulations); discussion infra Part IlI.C.

117.

Hayden, 449 E3d at 310-11. 323, 326-28; see also VOTING

RIGHTS ACT

§ 2, 42

U.S.C. § 1973 (2007).
118.
See Hayden, 449 F3d at 316; see also Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1228. The Supreme
Court has previously held that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly affirms
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Circuit found affirmative authorization for these laws in Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1 9 If section 2 of the VRA were to reach felon
disenfranchisement laws, then, the court foresaw a conflict because the
VRA could strike state laws that the Constitution validates. 12 In order to
avoid this constitutional conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Second Circuit precludes felon disenfranchisement challenges under the

III.

SOLUTION: DEVELOPING A NEW APPROACH TOVRAVOTE DENIAL
CHALLENGES TO FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS

Currently, there is no standard judicial approach to reviewing felon
disenfranchisement challenges under section 2 of the VRA. 122 The
Supreme Court has developed an approach to vote dilution claims
brought under section 2.123 However, the Court has not developed a

states' ability to disenfranchise felons. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 2 (declining to reduce
state's representation when state denies right to vote for participation in rebellion or other
crime); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (holding that Section 2 of Fourteenth Amendment allows states to disenfranchise felons).
See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54; Hayden, 449 E3d at 316; see also Johnson, 405 E3d
119.
at 1228; see discussion supra Part I.C.2. These courts hold that Section 2 of this Amendment affirms states' right to disenfranchise felons by declining to reduce a state's
representation for doing so. See U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 2; Hayden, 449 E3d at 316.
See Hayden, 449 E3d at 316; see also Johnson, 405 E3d at 1228-29.
120.
121.
Hayden, 449 E3d at 316; The canon of constitutional avoidance is a valid approach to statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371,381-84 (2005)
(discussing avoidance canon); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 131 (1970) (discussing
need to interpret statute in way to avoid constitutional conflict); Adrian Vermeule, Saving
Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1960-61 (1997) (discussing need to interpret statute in
way to avoid constitutional conflict). However, the argument is faulty. See infra Part III.B.2.
122.
This is true when the plaintiff frames the challenge as a vote denial claim. See
Tokaji, supra note 7, at 709 (discussing well-established approach to vote dilution claims
and acknowledging lack of comparable approach to vote denial claims). This Article looks
specifically at these challenges when framed as vote denial claims, despite the fact that
plaintiffs could rationally challenge these laws as resulting in vote dilution. See Hayden 449
F3d at 309 (challenging New York's felon disenfranchisement statute under both vote
denial and vote dilution frameworks); KING, supra note 54, at 19.
123.
See Tokaji, supra note 7, at 708-09. Vote dilution claims allege the abridgment of
a minority's ability to participate effectively in the political process, despite having the
opportunity to cast a ballot. See generally Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (facing
vote dilution challenge for first time after 1982 amendments to section 2 and developing
clear, bright line approach to these claims); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399 (2006) (applying Gingles approach to vote dilution challenge to Texas redistricting plan); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (attempting to apply Gingles approach to
vote dilution challenge); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (applying Gingles
approach to vote dilution challenge to Florida districting scheme).
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standard approach to vote denial claims, 124which include most VRA
challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws.
Until the Court adopts an approach to vote denial claims, the constitutionality of extending the VRA to felon disenfranchisement laws is
unclear. If courts apply strict scrutiny to all vote denial claims, they will
likely invalidate many state voting regulations.' 21 If courts do invalidate
these regulations, the VRA would impinge states' powers to regulate elections and would transcend the congressional record of discriminatory
voting regulations.1 26 Thus, such an approach would suggest that the VRA
unconstitutionally alters the federal-state balance of powers and exceeds
Congress's Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers. 127 However, if
courts apply only rational basis review to all claims, the VRA will not invalidate any felon disenfranchisement statute that does not already violate
the Fourteenth Amendment. 128 In this case, the VRA would neither alter
the federal-state balance of powers nor exceed Congress's enforcement
powers; therefore, it would be constitutional. 29Thus, the VRA's constitutionality if courts accept felon disenfranchisement challenges under
section 2 depends entirely on how courts review vote denial
124.
See Tokaji, supra note 7, at 704-09 (contrasting clear approach to vote dilution
claims with lack of clear approach to vote denial claims); see, e.g., Johnson, 405 F3d 1214
(11 th Cir. 2005) (pursuing vote denial cause of action under section 2); Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 E3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003) (pursuing vote denial cause of action under section
2). The Court must identify an approach to vote denial claims because section 2 addresses
both racially biased vote denial and vote dilution. See Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C.
1973 (2007) (proscribing denial of right to vote on account of race or color); Hayden, 449
F3d at 367-78 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). In fact, some Supreme Court justices have suggested that the VRA should only address vote denial claims, and not claims of vote
dilution. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 893 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that section 2 only
reaches state regulations that reduce citizens access to ballot).
125.
See 16B AM.JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 815 (2006) (referring to strict scrutiny
as heavy burden ofjustification on state).
126.
See discussion of constitutional concerns supra Part lI.B.
127.
See discussion of constitutional concerns supra Part lI.B.
128.
Because there are so many plausible state interests in denying felons' voting
rights, felon disenfranchisement laws will uniformly pass traditional rational basis review.
See, e.g., Hayden, 449 E3d at 326 (mentioning three plausible state interests that support
felon disenfranchisement statutes); Owens v. Barnes, 711 F2d 25, 28 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing rational justifications for felon disenfranchisement statutes); Green v. Bd. of
Elections, 380 E2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1967) (discussing possible justifications for felon
disenfranchisement statutes). Under modern Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, felon
disenfranchisement challenges trigger rational basis review, suggesting that this amendment
is no longer an effective vehicle for such challenges. See Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d
1333, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (deciding that felon disenfranchisement statutes are incapable
of violating either Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection or Due Process clauses). But
see Elena Saxonhouse, Note, Unequal Protection: Comparing Former Felons' Challenges to Disenfranchisement and Employment Discrimination, 56 STAN. L. Pv. 1597, 1623-27 (2004)
(suggesting that Fourteenth Amendment may still have power for felon disenfranchisement
challenges).
129.
See discussion of enforcement powers supra pp. 34-35.
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claims.Accordingly, the Supreme Court cannot determine whether the
VRA may constitutionally reach felon disenfranchisement laws until it
decides how to approach vote denial claims. The following section proposes a variation of Burdick's sliding scale scrutiny as an approach to vote
denial challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws under theVR-A. 3
A. The Mechanics of the New Sliding Scale Approach to Felon
Disenfranchisement Challenges
As described in Burdick, there are two prongs of sliding scale scrutiny
analysis. 31' First, a court must determine the severity of the burden a challenged statute imposes on voting rights.1 32 Second, a court must then
select and apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to the statute.' 3 Courts
applying the Burdick form of sliding scale scrutiny have failed to establish
clear requirements for fulfilling each prong.33 However, characteristics of
felon disenfranchisement challenges allow courts to identify specific evidentiary requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy.
1. Establishing aVote Denial Challenge to
a Felon Disenfranchisement Statute
The proposed form of sliding scale scrutiny requires a plaintiff to
prove three elements in order to establish a vote denial claim under section 2. 135 First, a plaintiff must show that he cannot vote because of the

130.
131.
132.

See Burdick v.Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992); see infra Part III.A.
See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433-34.
See id. at 434.

See id.
133.
The Burdick form of this analysis fails to guide courts specifically in the thresh134.
old determination of the severity of the burden. See id. at 434 (instructing courts to weigh
character and magnitude of burden, without identifying specific factors of this analysis).
While some courts require significant statistical evidence to show the burden is severe,
many courts seem to determine the severity of the burden instinctively. Compare Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-45 (1972) (using intuition to decide if burden is severe), with
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 578-82 (2000) (relying on plaintiff's evidence to determine that burden is severe).
By combining factors that courts and scholars currently discuss when addressing
135.
felon disenfranchisement challenges, the proposed approach simplifies the required totality
of the circumstances analysis. Voting Rights Act § 2b, 42 U.S.C. 1973 (2007) (requiring
totality of circumstances analysis for section 2 claim); see Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F3d 305,
314 n.7 (2d Cir. 2006) (mentioning that challenged New York statute was narrower in
scope than felon disenfranchisement statutes in other states); Farrakhan v. Washington, 338
E3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing plaintiff's evidence of racial bias in state's
criminal justice); Tokaji, supra note 7, at 724 (proposing that section 2 plaintiffi must be
able to trace voting rights infringement to bias in social and historical conditions). The
three threshold elements are theoretically analogous to the approach to vote dilution chal-
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state's felon disenfranchisement statute. 36This requirement is critical in
characterizing the claim as one of vote denial-as opposed to vote dilution-under section 2.37
Second, a plaintiff must develop a record of statistical data suggesting
racial bias in the state's criminal justice system. 138 Because it is theoretically
possible for minorities to commit felonies more frequently than nonminorities, evidence showing only minority over-representation among
felons fails to establish de jue bias.3 9 However, a plaintiff can establish bias
through a combination of evidence that the state disproportionately stops,
40
searches, arrests, charges, convicts, and/or severely sentences minorities.
Finally, a plaintiff must demonstrate a connection between the denial of his right to vote and the statistical racial bias in the criminal justice
system.' A plaintiff can demonstrate this connection by showing that his
race-or, at least, the racial category in which society places him-faces
lenges, in that they are necessary, and not sufficient, elements. See discussion of approach to
vote dilution challenges supra note 123.
136.
See, e.g., Mixom v. Conmonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 453 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000)
(holding disenfranchisement statute must prevent plaintiff from voting to confer standing,
even in vote dilution challenge).
137.
While a disenfranchised felon may theoretically pursue both a vote dilution and
vote denial claim, a non-disenfranchised felon could not pursue a vote denial claim. See
Tokaji, supra note 7, at 691-92 (contrasting vote denial and vote dilution claims under
section 2); supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
138.
It is important that a plaintiff need not prove that his individual status as a felon
is the result of tangible incidents of racial bias. See Tokaji, supra note 7 at 724 (stating that
section 2 plaintiffs need not prove intentional discrimination by state actor to establish a
vote denial claim). Such a requirement would present an insurmountable burden on plaintiffs and would contradict the 1982 section 2 amendments and the totality of the
circumstances approach. See supra Part I.D. Furthermore, should a plaintiff prove specific
incidents of racial bias, the plaintiff would have a cause of action under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. See supra note 72 and accompanying text; infra note 214.
139.
See 16B Am. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 815 (stating that although disparate
impact may be relevant evidence of racial discrimination, standing alone, this evidence is
insufficient); Tokaji, supra note 7, at 724-25 (suggesting that mere showing of overrepresentation among felons should not suffice to establish section 2 claim).
140.
In Johnson v. Bush, the unsuccessful plaintiffs established no more than a discrepancy between minorities' representation in Florida's population and their representation
among Florida's felons. 405 E3d 1214, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005) (Tjoflat,J., concurring). One
justice in Johnson wrote separately to acknowledge that, even if section 2 applied, the
plaintiffs failed to establish bias in the criminal justice system. Id. In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit has suggested that plaintiffs may prove bias through statistics showing racial disparities at multiple stages of the criminal justice system. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 E3d
1009, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, when facing these challenges today, the plaintiff's
ability to provide such statistical evidence seems to have an effect on the court's analysis.
Compare Johnson, 405 F3d at 1235 (discussing unsuccessful plaintiffs' inability to prove
racial bias through statistical evidence), with Farrakhan, 338 E3d at 1013-14 (discussing
successful plaintiffs' ability to prove racial bias through statistical evidence).
141.
See Tokaji, supra note 7, at 724 (proposing that section 2 plaintiffs must be able
to trace voting rights infringement to bias in social and historical conditions).
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bias in the criminal justice system. Importantly, citizens from
this group
143
must also suffer disproportionate rates of disenfranchisement.
While fulfilling the three required elements establishes a prima facie
vote denial challenge to felon disenfranchisement laws under section 2, it
does not guarantee success. 44 Under the proposed approach, a court only
applies heightened scrutiny-which is most advantageous to plaintiffs-if
14
the plaintiff can show that the statute substantially burdens voting rights.
Accordingly, the second prong of the sliding scale approach requires a
court to determine
the level of scrutiny to apply based on the severity of
14 6

the burden.

2. Determining the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie vote denial claim under section 2 of the VRA, the court must determine the appropriate level of
scrutiny.4 7 In order to do so, the court must characterize the magnitude of
the statute's burden on the plaintiff's voting ability using a two-factor
analysis. 14 The first factor of the analysis is the severity of the racial bias in

142.
Because victims of racism suffer this primarily because of appearance, this approach does not require a biological connection with the discriminated-against race. See
Ian E Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,
and Choice, 29 HAV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1994) (discussing how central appearance is
to racial identification and relative legal implications). For example, that a plaintiff is not
biologically Middle Eastern is irrelevant if a prejudiced society would nonetheless perceive
him and treat him as such. See Ken Davison, Note and Comment, The Mixed-Race Experience: Treatment of Racially Miscategorized Individuals Under Title VII, 12 AsiAN L.J. 161,161-62
(2005) (stating that using physical features to determine race leads to racial miscategorization and results in misapplied prejudices). This plaintiff's experience with the criminal
justice system would inevitably mirror that of a person of Middle Eastern dissent. See id.
Ultimately, this plaintiff may still lose the right to vote on account of race or color. See
Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. 1973 (2007).
143.
See Tokaji, supra note 7, at 724 (proposing that plaintiffs prove disparate impact
on minority voters to establish section 2 vote denial claim).
144.
The proposed factors seek to demonstrate that the felon disenfranchisement law
results in discriminatory vote denial, based on the totality of the circumstances. Voting
Rights Act § 2b. The text of section 2 identifies this consideration as the standard for establishing a violation. Id. (mandating a totality of the circumstances analysis for section 2
claims).
145.
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992) (discussing requirement that
court adjusts level of scrutiny relative to demonstrated burden on voting rights); 16B AM.
JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 815 (2006) (referring to strict scrutiny as heavy burden of
justification on state).

146.

Id.

147.
See id. (discussing requirement that court adjusts level of scrutiny relative to
demonstrated burden on voting rights).
148.
Id.
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the state's criminal justice system, as evidenced by statistics. The second
factor is the scope of the state's disenfranchisement statute.5 °The statute's
scope is narrow when it disenfranchises a felon only during incarceration,
yet it is most expansive when it disenfranchises a felon for life.
A plaintiff's ability to prove racial bias combined with the scope of
the law are the primary factors in determining the level of scrutiny.'5'
When a plaintiff establishes significant racial bias and the challenged stat152
ute is expansive in scope, courts should apply strict scrutiny.
Conversely, when a plaintiff fails to show significant bias and the law is
limited in scope, courts should apply rational basis review to the statute.1 13 If both the level of racial bias and the scope of the law are
moderate, courts should apply intermediate scrutiny. Courts should

149.
The Ninth Circuit discussed this consideration when allowing a challenge to
felon disenfranchisement laws under section 2. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F3d 1009,
1013 (9th Cit. 2003) (referring to plaintiff's evidence of racial bias in state's criminal justice system as compelling).
150.
The Second Circuit mentioned this consideration in its analysis of the section 2
challenge. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 E3d 305, 314 n.7 (2d Cit. 2006) (distinguishing claim at
bar from claims addressed in Farrakhan and Johnson because Hayden plaintiff challenged
NewYork statute that was much more limited in scope).
151.
See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (requiring courts to determine level of scrutiny
relative to magnitude of burden on voting rights).
According to the Burdick Court, laws that impose severe restrictions on voting
152.
rights must be narrowly drawn to advance a compelling state interest. Id.; see also Norman
v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279,289 (1992); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1462 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
"strict scrutiny").
153.
According to the Burdick Court, when an election law imposes only reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions on voting rights, the state's regulatory interests generally
justify the restrictions. 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,788
(1983)). Although arguably ambiguous, later courts have interpreted this statement to require rational basis review when the burden imposed is slight. See, e.g., Werme v. Merrill,
84 F3d 479, 485-86 (1st Cir. 1996) (following Burdick and applying rational basis review
because burden imposed is slight).
154.
When applying the Burdick variation of sliding scale scrutiny, courts disagree
about if or when something between strict scrutiny and rational basis review should apply.
Conipare Fulani v. Krivanek, 973 E2d 1539, 1544, 1546-47 (11th Cit. 1992) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to statute that resulted in burden that is neither severe nor slight),
and Pilcher v. Rains, 853 F2d 334, 337 (5th Cit. 1988) (applying intermediate scrutiny to
statute that resulted in burden that is neither severe nor slight), with Schrader v. Blackwell,
241 E3d 783, 788-91 (6th Cit. 2001) (applying simple balancing test to statute imposing
intermediate burden), New Alliance Party of Ala. v. Hand, 933 F2d 1568, 1576 (11th Cit.
1991) (employing balancing test to statute imposing "not insurmountable" burden). Under
the proposed approach, however, statutes imposing intermediate burdens on voting rights
should have to be reasonably necessary to further a legitimate state interest. See Fulani,973
E2d at 1544-47 (using sliding scale scrutiny, and applying intermediate scrutiny to statute
imposing intermediate burden on plaintiff's rights); BILcIC's LAw DICTIONARY 833 (8th ed.
2004) (defining "intermediate scrutiny").
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also apply intermediate scrutiny when the racial bias is severe but the
scope of the law is limited, or vice versa."'
While these two factors will control the analysis, a court should have
discretion to adjust the result relative to additional evidence of a severe
burden) 6 Such evidence may include vague statutory language or evidence establishing any of the factors Congress codified during the 1982
amendment process." 7 These factors include, among others, the extent to
which official discrimination and prejudice in social institutions affects
minorities' ability to vote. 5 8 Allowing this adjustment serves two purposes.
First, this discretion allows courts to incorporate additional, unanticipated
evidence of a severe burden into their analyses. ' 59 Second, this discretion
allows courts to comply60 with the congressionally mandated totality of the
circumstances analysis.'
B. The ProposedApproach Should Apply to VRA
Felon Disenfranchisement Challenges
The proposed approach to felon disenfranchisement challenges under section 2 of the VRA is an adaptation of Burdick's sliding scale scrutiny,
which now applies to voting rights challenges brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.16 Because the Burdick approach currently applies to
other voting rights cases, the Court would not be unfounded in adopting
155.
In these situations, the burden on voting rights is also intermediate. See supra
note 154 and accompanying text.
156.
Excluding potentially relevant evidence beyond that which fulfills the threshold
factors would contradict the totality of the circumstances analysis required by section 2.
Voting Rights Act 5 2b, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2007).
157.
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982); see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
765-70 (1973) (using several factors to strike multimember district scheme); Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 E2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (discussing numerous factors, adopted
from Regester, that courts should use to find constitutional violation where plaintiff has not
shown invidious intent); discussion of varying statutory language supra Part I.C.1.
158.
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982).
159.
The flexibility to accept additional evidence beyond the threshold requirements
is important because, when targeting racially discriminatory voting regulations, bright line
rules are not desirable. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 984 (1996) (stating that bright line
rules are not available when confronting claims of racially discriminatory districting
scheme). While the approach to vote dilution challenges features similar threshold evidentiary requirements, the Supreme Court supplements these factors by analyzing additional
evidence of discriminatory impact. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)
(describing appropriate approach to vote dilution claims under section 2 of the VRA);
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011-12 (1994) (deciding that full totality of circumstances analysis must follow bright line Gingles preconditions for vote dilution challenge).
160.
See Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. S 1973 (2007); see also discussion of
amendments to section 2, supra Part I.D.
161.
See, e.g., Weber v. Shelley, 347 E3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003); Werme v. Merrill,
84 E3d 479,483-84 (1st Cir. 1996); Schulz v.Williams, 44 E3d 48,55-56 (2d Cit. 1994).
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a similar analysis for VRA claims. 162The proposed variation of sliding scale
scrutiny enables courts to confront felon disenfranchisement challenges
uniformly, in a manner consistent with both judicial precedent and legislative intent.
1. Consistent Judicial Application of Sliding Scale Scrutiny
The proposed approach to felon disenfranchisement challenges under section 2 of the VRA will allow courts to approach these challenges
in a consistent manner. An important function of the Supreme Court is to
settle163splits of authority so that federal laws apply uniformly to all citizens. However, the Burdick Court failed to achieve this goal when it
inadequately delineated the correct analysis of a statute's burden on voting
rights under sliding scale scrutiny. 164 As a result, courts have struggled to
apply the Burdick variation of sliding scale scrutiny consistently.6 While
some courts require plaintiffs to provide statistical evidence showing a
severe burden on voting rights, other courts rely on intuition when
weighing the burden.16 By contrast, the proposed form of sliding scale
scrutiny identifies specific factors included in this analysis, thus allowing
courts to confront felon disenfranchisement challenges consistently.
To ensure judicial consistency, the proposed approach exploits the
common characteristics of felon disenfranchisement challenges brought
under section 2. These claims unvaryingly allege that racial bias in a state's
criminal justice system results in voting rights infringement via the state's
disenfranchisement statute. 167 Incorporating these commonalities into
162.
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432-34 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 789-90 (1983). Anderson is a ballot access case, but the Court has acknowledged that laws that affect candidates have at least some indirect effect on voters. Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). In Burdick, the Court believed employing the approach
used in ballot access cases was appropriate for voting rights cases, due to the similarity
between these claims. 504 U.S. at 433. It would be at least as appropriate, then, to adopt a
form of the analysis used in Fourteenth Amendment voting rights cases to apply to VRA
cases.

163.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that mere necessity of
uniformity in national laws decides question of federal judicial powers); Joel S. Flaxman,
Steven's Ratchet: When the Court Should Decide Not to Decide, 105 MiCH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 94, 94, 96 (2006), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol105/
flaxman.pdf (discussing uniform application of federal laws as motivating factor for granting certiorari); see, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 U.S. 2405, 2408
(2006) (resolving circuit split about interpretation of employment discrimination statute's
language); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 340 (2005) (resolving circuit split
about requirements for proving economic loss in securities fraud claims).
164.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
165.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
166.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
167.
See, e.g., Hayden v. Pataki, 449 E3d 305, 310-12 (2d Cir. 2006) (featuring section 2 challenge to felon disenfranchisement statute); Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F3d 102,
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specific evidentiary requirements ensures that courts throughout the
country will approach felon disenfranchisement challenges similarly. Not
only will future plaintiffs know exactly what evidence they must provide,
but they will also anticipate the scrutiny their claims will elicit. 68
2. Consistency with Precedent and Legislative Intent
The Supreme Court has demanded the broadest possible interpretation and application of the VRA, warning that no judicially created
limitation on its coverage is acceptable. 69 However, absent a statutory exemption for felon disenfranchisement laws, precluding such challenges
would result in a judicially created limitation on the VRA's coverage.""
Therefore, only an approach that allows courts to accept felon disenfranchisement challenges under section 2 honors the Supreme Court's VRA
jurisprudence. 7' The proposed approach allows 72
courts to hear these section 2 challenges effectively and constitutionally.
The proposed form of sliding scale scrutiny also allows courts to apply the VRA in a manner consistent with legislative intent. When
amending section 2 in 1982, Congress identified seven factors signifying a
denial or abridgement of voting rights based on the totality of circumstances. 1 One of these factors is the extent to which the minority group
suffers discrimination in social institutions such as education, employment,
and health. 7 4 These institutions are similar in that they substantially impact the quality of citizens' lives and accordingly face some amount of
federal government regulation.' 5 The same is true for the criminal justice
103-06 (2d Cir. 2004) (featuring section 2 challenge to felon disenfranchisement statute);
Johnson v. Bush, 214 F Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (featuring section 2 challenge
to felon disenfranchisement statute); Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 E Supp. 1304, 1307 (E.D.
Wash. 1997) (featuring section 2 challenge to felon disenfranchisement statute); Wesley v.
Collins, 605 F Supp. 802, 804 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (featuring section 2 challenge to felon
disenfranchisement statute).
168.
See Jedna BednarJudicialPredictabilityand Federal Stability: Strategic Consequences of
Institutional Imperfection, 16 J. OF THEORETICAL POt. 423, 425 (2004) (discussing problems
associated with imperfect and unpredictable court, and ramification on plaintiffs).
169.
See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1990).
170.
Id.
171.
See id.; see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1969).
172.
See infra Part III.C (discussing constitutional considerations).
173.
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982); Boyd, supra note 84, at 1400 n.260 (discussing that codified factors were meant to adopt factors used in Court's analysis in White
v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,765-70 (1973)).
174.
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982).
175.
See United States Department of Education, http://www.ed.gov (last visited
Feb. 12, 2007); United States Department of Health and Human Services,
http://www.dhhs.gov (last visited Feb. 12, 2007); United States Department of Labor,
http://www.dol.gov (last visited Feb. 12,2007).
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system. 17 6Thus, bias in this institution satisfies a specified factor of the
congressionally mandated totality of the circumstances analysis.' Therefore, ignoring bias in the criminal justice system would contradict
Congress's intent when enacting the VRA. 78 However, the proposed approach complies with legislative intent by allowing courts to analyze
historical evidence of bias in the criminal justice system.
Those opposed to courts accepting challenges to felon disenfranchisement statutes under section 2 might claim that Congress excluded
these laws from the VRA. 79When amending section 4 of the VRA, which
lists absolutely prohibited voting regulations, Congress chose not to add
felon disenfranchisement statutes to this list."8° Furthermore, one Senator
emphasized that the amended section 4 would not invalidate felon disenfranchisement laws.18' This argument suggests that, by excluding felon
disenfranchisement laws from section 4, Congress intended to exclude
these voting regulations from all sections of the VRA.
However, this argument fails because the legislative history of one
section of the VRA does not represent Congress's intent in another section.183 By not adding felon disenfranchisement statutes to section 4,

176.
See United States Department ofJustice, http://www.usdoj.gov (last visited Feb.
12,2007).
177.
See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982); GARY LAFREE, LOSING LEGITIMACY:
STREET CRIME AND THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA 152 (Westview Press
1998) (emphasizing education and criminal justice as two of three social institutions of
increasing importance); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMISSION ON BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCES AND EDUCATION,

RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES: SYNTHESIS OF STUDIES ON ADOLES-

20-29 (Michael D. Kipke ed., 1999) (Juxtaposing education, healthcare, and
criminal justice systems as major social institutions involved in adolescents' lives).
178.
SeeVoting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2007).
179.
See, e.g., Hayden v. Pataki, 449 E3d 305, 318-319 (2d Cir. 2006) (deciding that
Congress intended to exclude felon disenfranchisement laws from purview of entire
VRA).
180.
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2007). This is a point emphasized by
both the Senate Judiciary Committee and the House Judiciary Committee. H.R. REP. No.
89-439, at 24-26 (1965).
181.
111 CONG. REC. S8366 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1965) (statement of Sen.Tydings).
182.
This argument focuses on the fact that Congress had the opportunity to include
felon disenfranchisement statutes among the state practices uniformly prohibited by section 4. See, e.g., Hayden, 449 E3d at 318-319 (discussing argument that Congress intended
to exclude felon disenfranchisement laws from scope of VRA). By declining to do so,
Congress may have demonstrated its intent to exclude felon disenfranchisement statutes
from the VRA's purview. See id.
183.
See id. at 352-53 (Parker, J., dissenting) (stating that legislative history of one
section of expansive statute such as VRA is of no value when attempting to understand
other section);Johnson v. Bush, 405 F3d 1214, 1249 (11th Cir. 2005) (Barkett,J., dissenting) (discussing that decision to not add felon disenfranchisement statutes to list of per se
violations does not show intent to exempt these laws from VRA); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory
CENCE
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Congress merely declined to characterize these laws as per se violative of
the VRA.184 This decision does not signify that felon disenfranchisement
laws can never violate any section of the VRA. Instead, section 2 addresses
voting regulations that are not per se invalid under section 4 but nonetheless result in a racially disparate impact on voting rights. 85 Thus, allowing
felon disenfranchisement challenges under section 2 comports with the
legislative intent of the VRA.
C. The ProposedApproach Addresses the Second
Circuit's Constitutional Concerns
The Supreme Court must delineate an approach to felon disenfranchisement challenges under section 2 before addressing the Second
Circuit's constitutional concerns.186 By adopting the proposed approach,
the Court can address these concerns and affirm the VRA's constitutionality. Because this approach allows courts to alter the scrutiny relative to
the burden on voting rights, it assuages the Second Circuit's fears of unconstitutional consequences.17
First, contrary to the Second Circuit's predictions, the VRA will remain a valid use of Congress's enforcement powers under the Fifteenth
Amendment. Specifically, under the proposed approach the VRA will remain a congruent and proportional response to the record of racially
discriminatory voting rights legislation. 88 Instead of targeting specific racially biased voting regulations, Congress drafted the VRA as a general
prophylactic statute to prevent even unpredicted forms of this evil. 8 9As
such, providing an exhaustive list of specific state ploys used to restrict
minority voting rights was both impossible and illogical.
Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1300-01 (1990) (presenting textualist argument that
even legislative history of statute is not accurate indicator of intent for same statute).
184.
See Hayden, 449 E3d at 364-66 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (stating that although
felon disenfranchisement statutes are not per se invalid under section 4, issue is if they
violate section 2 when having discriminatory effect);Johnson, 405 E3d at 1249 (Barkett,J.,
dissenting) (stating that decision to not invalidate all felon disenfranchisement laws under
section 4 does not mean that these laws are free from any attacks).
185.
Section 2 instructs the judiciary on how to determine whether a nonprohibited regulation nonetheless results in a VRA violation. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
1973 (2007).
186.
See supra Part I1,B (discussing the Second Circuit's constitutional concerns);
supra pp. 36-40 (discussing the need to adopt an approach to vote denial claims under
section 2 before addressing these concerns.
187.
See supra Part 11.A.2 (discussing the court's ability to adjust the level of scrutiny).
188.
See City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520, 532-33 (1997).
189.
See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 E3d 305, 361-62 (2d Cir. 2006) (Parker,J., dissenting)
(discussing historical struggle between federal government and creatively oppressive state
legislatures, and need forVRA to be broad and prophylactic).
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In the absence of a specific and exhaustive record of discriminatory felon disenfranchisement statutes that the VRA targets, one must
consider the VRA's constitutionality relative to the general record and
history of discriminatory voting regulations.' 9° Because section 2 targets
discriminatory ends and not means in order to pre-empt states in their
attempts to infringe minority voting rights, the VRA will remain constitutional if it targets only voting restrictions with racially burdensome
effects. 91 Such statutes, in whatever form they may take, definitively fall
within the purview of the Fifteenth Amendment.
The proposed approach protects the VRA as a valid use of enforcement powers by narrowly focusing the judiciary's power to strike
felon disenfranchisement statutes. Much like an anticipatory warrant in
criminal procedure jurisprudence, the proposed approach proactively
identifies a set of factors that suggest racial bias. 92 Accordingly, should
these factors exist, a challenged statute likely falls within the record and
history of racially oppressive voting restrictions. However, courts will
not have the power to strike statutes until the identified factors are fulfilled. Thus, the proposed approach allows courts to strike racially biased
voting restrictions that are within the purview of the Fifteenth Amendment, without forcing Congress to update constantly its specific record
of racially discriminatory voting regulations. Requiring Congress to do
so would cause significant delay in invalidating racially restrictive voting
statutes, and give state legislatures a substantial head start in the formidable cat and mouse game.
Second, the proposed approach prevents section 2 from impermissibly altering the balance between the federal and state governments, as
the Second Circuit surmises. 9" Under the United States system of federalism, states are largely sovereign and enjoy significant power to regulate
elections. 9 4 However, numerous Amendments show that this power is
190.
See id. (arguing that there is "no evidence in the record before Congress of a
history and pattern of invidious felon disenfranchisement by the states"). But see id. at 33037 (WalkerJ., concurring). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that this record is significant. See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001) (discussing
record of substantially discriminatory state voting regulations preceding VRA); South
Carolina v. Katzenbacli, 383 U.S. 301, 308-15 (1966) (discussing, at length, history of stateimposed racially discriminatory voting regulations).
191.
However, there is some evidence of intentionally discriminatory felon disenfranchisement laws. See Behrens, supra note 41, at 244-47 (discussing connection between
felon disenfranchisement laws and history of discriminatory legislative intent).
192.
See, e.g., United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 96-97 (2006) (holding that anticipatory warrants may be valid, so long as probable cause exists that: i) triggering events will
occur, and ii) if triggering events occur, target of search will be found).
193.
See supra Part II.B.
194.
See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl.I (declaring that "[t]he Times, Places, and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof..."); U.S. CONsT. amend. X (affording states all powers not delegated to federal government by Constitution); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001)
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not entirely free from federal control. ' 95 For example, the Fifteenth
Amendment restrains states from denying citizens the right to vote96

powers.'
based on their race, thus altering the federal-state balance of
The VRA, which Congress passed to enforce this amendment, merely
enforces this legitimate federal constraint.'97 If the application of section
2 to felon disenfranchisement laws corresponds with the Fifteenth
Amendment's purpose, the VRA will not further alter the federal-state
balance. g

The approach to felon disenfranchisement challenges under section 2 will determine if the VRA impermissibly exaggerates the
Fifteenth Amendment's alteration of federal-state powers. Allowing
courts to strike statutes that are racially neutral both facially and in application would significantly increase this alteration. However, the
proposed approach avoids this result by allowing courts to target only
felon disenfranchisement laws that impose a substantial burden on minorities' voting rights.' 99 This quality would thus allow courts to avoid
impermissibly altering the federal-state balance by enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment in a way that is consistent with that Amendment's
protection of minority voting rights. 20
However, those opposed to allowing felon disenfranchisement
challenges might argue that the Fourteenth Amendment affirms a state's
power to disenfranchise citizens who commit felonies.2 0 1 Echoing the
(discussing states' broad authority to regulate elections); Tashjian v. Republican Party of
Conn., 479 U.S. 208,217 (1986) (discussing states' broad authority to regulate elections).
195.
See supra Part I.A (discussing judicial voting rights protection); see also U.S.
CoNsT. amends. XII, XIV 5 2, XV, XVII, XIX, XXIV, XXVI (regulating elections through
federal law).
196.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see Hayden v. Pataki, 449 E3d 305, 358 (2d Cir. 2006)
(Parker, J., dissenting) (noting that Reconstruction Amendments intentionally altered federal-state balance, andVRA merely enforces this alteration).
197.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV However, this does not signify that all laws passed
under Congress's enforcement powers will not unconstitutionally alter the federal-state
balance. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 647 (1999) (holding that Congress violated enforcement power by abrogating states'
sovereign immunity using Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment). See generally Donald
Francis Donovan, Toward Limits on Congressional Enforcement Power Under the Civil War
Amendments, 34 STAN. L. REv. 453 (1982) (discussing history of enforcement power doctrine and limitations to powers with thorough case law analysis).
198.
The purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment was to guarantee that African American voting rights were both national and permanent. See Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction,
Felon Disenfranchisement,and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEo. LJ. 259, 272 (2004) (discussing legislative intent of
Fifteenth Amendment).
199.
See discussion of the mechanics of the proposed approach supra Part lII.A.
200.
See discussion of this concern supra pp. 29-30.
201.
See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-42, 54 (1974) (finding affirmative
authorization for felon disenfranchisement statutes in Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F3d 305, 316 (discussing approval for felon disenfran-
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Second Circuit's stance, some argue that Section 2 of the Fourteenth

Amendment authorizes these laws by withholding punishment when
states disenfranchise felons. Accordingly, this argument suggests that if
courts strike any felon disenfranchisement laws
under the VRA, the Act
03
impermissibly alters the federal-state balance.
This argument is flawed, however, because the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant states an unconditional power to disenfranchise
felons.2 4 Instead, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows states
to disenfranchise felons without federal punishment only when doing so
is legally valid.. However, when felon disenfranchisement laws disproportionately affect minorities' voting rights, the VRA provides that these
statutes are not legally valid.0 Accordingly, courts applying the VRA to
felon disenfranchisement challenges should only strike statutes that are
not within the Fourteenth Amendment's limited authorization for these
207

laws .

chisement statutes in Section 2 of Fourteenth Amendment); Johnson v. Bush, 405 E3d
1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing approval for felon disenfranchisement statutes in
Section 2 of Fourteenth Amendment). But see Chin, supra note 198, at 260 (suggesting that
Congress repealed Section 2 of Fourteenth Amendment by enacting Fifteenth Amendment).
202.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Richardson, 418 U.S. at 41-42, 54 (finding affirmative authorization for felon disenfranchisement statutes in Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Hayden, 449 E3d at 316 (discussing approval for felon disenfranchisement statutes in Section 2 of Fourteenth Amendment); Johnson, 405 E3d at 1228
(discussing approval for felon disenfranchisement statutes in Section 2 of Fourteenth
Amendment).
203.
See Hayden, 449 F3d at 326 (deciding that, because of explicit approval for felon
disenfranchisement statutes in Section 2 of Fourteenth Amendment, VRA would alter
federal-state balance if it covered these laws).
204.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. See Johnson, 405 E3d at 1240 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (discussing proper interpretation of Section 2 of Fourteenth Amendment). But see
discussion of Richardson v. Ramirez supra Part I.C.2.
205.
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment punishes states for denying voting
rights to eligible citizens by reducing the state's representation in the federal legislature.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2. According to the text, states are not subject to this punishment for denying the right to vote for participation in rebellion or other crime. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
206.
See Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2007); discussion of section 2 supra Part
I.D; see also Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 E3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that
although states may disenfranchise felons without violating Fourteenth Amendment, when
these statutes infringe voting rights in discriminatory manner, VRA is vehicle for redress).
Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as blanket authorization for felon disenfranchisement laws would lead to an incongruent consequence. See ERIc FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 251-61 (2002) (discussing enactment of Fourteenth Amendment and racial considerations). This reconstruction
amendment, passed to strengthen minority rights, would then provide states with a tool to
enact racially discriminatory voting legislation without repercussion. See id.
207.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (Withholding punishment of reduced representation when state disenfranchises for participation in rebellion or other crime).
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The proposed approach enables courts to distinguish the legally
valid laws from the impermissible laws by focusing on the burden imposed on minority voting rights. 208 This distinction enables section 2 of
the VRA to parallel the Fourteenth Amendment's minority rights protection, while respecting that Amendment's limited authorization for
felon disenfranchisement.209 Thus, allowing courts to strike specific felon
disenfranchisement statutes under the VRA would neither conflict with
the Fourteenth Amendment, nor unconstitutionally alter the federalstate balance.
D. The ProposedApproach Allows Use of the VRA
as the Only PlausibleAvenue for Redress
Adopting the proposed approach to felon disenfranchisement
statutes under section 2 of the VRA will re-open the courthouse doors
to disenfranchised minorities seeking judicial redress. 211 It is a
fundamental function of the judiciary to afford citizens the ability to
challenge laws that violate their rights.1 As the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals acknowledged in Farrakhan, even ex-felons have the right to
challenge racially discriminatory voting regulations.2 13 Unfortunately, the
for felon
Supreme
Court's use of rational basis review
disenfranchisement challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment has
precluded felons from effectively challenging felon disenfranchisement
laws.21 4 However, section 2 of the VRA may provide felons with an
208.
See discussion of the mechanics of the proposed approach supra Part III.A.
209.
For a discussion of the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and racial
considerations, see FONER, supra note 206, at 251-61.
210.
See supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text (discussing proposed approach's
effect on federal-state balance of powers); supra notes 206-211 and accompanying text
(describing section 2's compatibility with Fourteenth Amendment if applied to felon disenfranchisement laws).
211.
See discussion of Richardson v. Ramirez, which held that Constitution expressly
allows felon disenfranchisement laws supra Part I.C.2.
212.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803) (declaring that
very essence of civil liberty is to afford every plaintiff remedy for violation of rights); THE
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing function ofjudicial branch as essential safeguard against ill humors of society, including protecting private rights of citizens
against unjust and partial laws); THE FEDERALIsT No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (opining
that spirit behind fraudulent state laws will survive constitutional safeguards, and that federal judiciary must have control over state practices); see also Taxier v. Sweet, 2 Dal]. 81, 82
(Pa. 1766) (stating that if plaintiffi were without remedy at law, court would provide some
remedy to redress plaintiffi' injury).
213.
Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that permitting even a convicted felon to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws enforces right
that every citizen has to challenge racially discriminatory voting regulations).
214.
See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (holding that strict scrutiny
applies to felon disenfranchisement statute when plaintiffs establish invidious intent);
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alternative means to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws, but the
Court must first develop an effective approach to these claims that
protects the VRA's constitutionality. 215The Court should adopt the
proposed approach because it protects the constitutionality of the VRA
while providing felons with an effective vehicle to challenge
disenfranchisement laws. 6
CONCLUSION
Despite their opposite conclusions, the Ninth and Second Circuits
share a commonality when analyzing challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws under section 2 of the VRA: they both jump to
conclusions. These circuits assume that they can foresee the consequences of allowing such challenges, yet disagree about the
constitutionality of those consequences. The irony is that both circuits
are wrong.
Both the Ninth and Second Circuits overlook that courts do not
currently have the analytical tools to consider vote denial challenges
under section 2. Accordingly, the constitutional implications of accepting felon disenfranchisement challenges under section 2 are
unforeseeable. When and if the Supreme Court addresses this split of
authority, it must first establish a standard approach to vote denial claims
under section 2.217 Only then can the Court determine the merits of
each circuit's rationale.218
This Article proposed a variation of sliding scale scrutiny as an effec219
tive approach to felon disenfranchisement challenges under section 2.
Such an approach allows courts to address felon disenfranchisement challenges uniformly and in a manner consistent with Supreme Court
precedent and legislative intent. 22° Furthermore, this approach protects the
constitutional validity of the VRA, while affording courts the authority to

Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-55 (1974) (holding that states can disenfranchise
felons due to affirmative authorization for such laws in section 2 of Fourteenth Amend-

ment); see also Elena Saxonhouse, Note, Unequal Protection: Comparing Former Felons'
Challenges to Disenfranchisementand Employment Discrinination,56 STAN. L. R-v. 1597, 162427 (2004) (discussing lack of effective challenge to felon disenfranchisement laws under
Equal Protection Clause).
215.
Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2007); see discussion supra Parts ID,
IllI.
216.
See supra Part II.C.
217.
See supra notes 122-129 and accompanying text.
218.
See Tokaji, supra note 7, at 732-33 (stating that while individuals may argue over
best approach to section 2 vote denial claims, important thing is for courts to develop
some workable standard).
219.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
220.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
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regulate felon disenfranchisement statutes under section 2.221 Finally, the
proposed approach enables disenfranchised felons to challenge poten222
tially racially discriminatory laws that prevent them from voting.
Under the current application of the law, however, felons may have lost
their ability to protect their voting rights because federal courts have
jumped to conclusions.

221.
222.

See discussion supra Part III.C.
See discussion supra Part III.D.

